mirror of
https://github.com/mimblewimble/grin-wallet.git
synced 2025-01-21 03:21:08 +03:00
9450d2a3b8
* Add support for sending compact slates (#366) * WIP add support for sending compact slates * add repopulate_tx function to internal API * first pass at compacted slate working * move slate compaction to separate function * test fixes * support compact slate inits in invoice workflow * add compress flags to send and invoice * attempting to remove is_compact and assume all V4 slates begin as compact * attempting to calculate offsets when full tx data isn't available * update calc_commit to use participant blind data * update doctests for compact slates * start to remove unneeded fields from serialization * make num_participants optional * remove other_version from slate * use grin master branch * remove message field * lock height assumed to be 0 if it doesn't exist * don't serialise receiver signature when null * don't serialize payment_info if not needed * remove participant id from participant info * add note on id field * fix finalize and receive doctests * finalize_tx tests, init_send_tx tests * doctests for process_invoice_tx, retrieve_tx, tx_lock_outputs * finished test changes * update from grin master * rebuild PR from diff (#380) * recreate PR from diff (#381) * serialize tx struct into top level coms object (#382) * remove height (#383) * Add State Slate (#384) * add state field to slate and SlateV4 * set slate state at each transaction stage, add check to tests * serialize slate status properly * V4 Slate field tweaks (#386) * various tweaks to V4 slate * field renaming * serialize slate v4 ID as base64 (#387) * remove amount and fee where not needed (#388) * Final Changes for compact Slate (#389) * add tests for all types of file output, remove message args * default range proof serialization * shorten output features serialization * rename payment proof fields in slate v4 * v4 payment proof serialization * Binary Slates (#385) * start test implementation * add experimental binary serialization to slate * serialize id * serialize fields that can be skipped as a separate struct * factor out sigs serialization * clean up sigs and coms serialization * completed v4 bin serialization * add manual de/ser traits for V4 bin slate * add simple byte array serializer * complete wiring in of bin slate serialization * clarify comment * clarify comment * update version * test output dir name fix * update slate v4 change description * add binary output to command line * Remove unneeded signature data during S2 and I2 stages (#390) * remove unneeded return signature data during S2 * remove unneeded sig data from I2 * Doctest Fixes for compact slate branch (#392) * begin to fix doctests * more doctest fixes * fix receive_tx * update get_stored_tx to accept an UUID instead of a tx object, and operate on a raw Transaction object (#394) * Fixes to async transaction posting (#395) * unstash post_tx changes * add offset during S3 and I3 * Revert slate id serialization to hex-string uuid (#396) * update from master (#397) * v3.x.x - v4.0.0 wallet compatibility fixes (#398) * changes to support http sending to v3 wallets * sending via http/tor TO 3.0.0 wallet works * receiving FROM 3.0.0 wallets works over http/tor * output converted V3 slate when needed * paying invoices from 3.0.0 wallets working * handle all participant info in slate states * sending and receiving standard file transactions between v3 and 4 wallets confirmed working * all file-based workflows working * fixes resulting from tests * remove reminder warnings * remove lock_height, add kernel_features + arguments (#399) * grin-wallet master now building against grin master (#402) (#403) Co-authored-by: Antioch Peverell <apeverell@protonmail.com> * Enhanced offset creation (#407) * initial tests reworking offset creation * invoice flow fixing + tests * further test fixes * change offset name in v4 slate, base64 serialize * logic optimisation * changes based on review feedback Co-authored-by: Antioch Peverell <apeverell@protonmail.com>
524 lines
14 KiB
Rust
524 lines
14 KiB
Rust
// Copyright 2019 The Grin Developers
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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//! core::libtx specific tests
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use grin_wallet_libwallet::Context;
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use grin_wallet_util::grin_core::core::transaction;
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use grin_wallet_util::grin_core::libtx::{aggsig, proof};
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use grin_wallet_util::grin_keychain::{
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BlindSum, BlindingFactor, ExtKeychain, ExtKeychainPath, Keychain, SwitchCommitmentType,
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};
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use grin_wallet_util::grin_util::secp;
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use grin_wallet_util::grin_util::secp::key::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
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use rand::thread_rng;
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fn kernel_sig_msg() -> secp::Message {
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transaction::KernelFeatures::Plain { fee: 0 }
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.kernel_sig_msg()
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.unwrap()
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}
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#[test]
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fn aggsig_sender_receiver_interaction() {
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let parent = ExtKeychainPath::new(1, 1, 0, 0, 0).to_identifier();
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let switch = SwitchCommitmentType::Regular;
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let sender_keychain = ExtKeychain::from_random_seed(true).unwrap();
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let receiver_keychain = ExtKeychain::from_random_seed(true).unwrap();
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// Calculate the kernel excess here for convenience.
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// Normally this would happen during transaction building.
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let kernel_excess = {
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let id1 = ExtKeychain::derive_key_id(1, 1, 0, 0, 0);
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let skey1 = sender_keychain.derive_key(0, &id1, switch).unwrap();
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let skey2 = receiver_keychain.derive_key(0, &id1, switch).unwrap();
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let keychain = ExtKeychain::from_random_seed(true).unwrap();
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let blinding_factor = keychain
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.blind_sum(
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&BlindSum::new()
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.sub_blinding_factor(BlindingFactor::from_secret_key(skey1))
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.add_blinding_factor(BlindingFactor::from_secret_key(skey2)),
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)
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.unwrap();
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keychain
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.secp()
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.commit(0, blinding_factor.secret_key(&keychain.secp()).unwrap())
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.unwrap()
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};
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let s_cx;
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let mut rx_cx;
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// sender starts the tx interaction
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let (sender_pub_excess, _sender_pub_nonce) = {
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let keychain = sender_keychain.clone();
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let id1 = ExtKeychain::derive_key_id(1, 1, 0, 0, 0);
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let skey = keychain.derive_key(0, &id1, switch).unwrap();
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// dealing with an input here so we need to negate the blinding_factor
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// rather than use it as is
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let bs = BlindSum::new();
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let blinding_factor = keychain
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.blind_sum(&bs.sub_blinding_factor(BlindingFactor::from_secret_key(skey)))
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.unwrap();
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let blind = blinding_factor.secret_key(&keychain.secp()).unwrap();
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s_cx = Context::new(&keychain.secp(), blind, &parent, false, false);
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s_cx.get_public_keys(&keychain.secp())
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};
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let pub_nonce_sum;
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let pub_key_sum;
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// receiver receives partial tx
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let (receiver_pub_excess, _receiver_pub_nonce, rx_sig_part) = {
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let keychain = receiver_keychain.clone();
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let key_id = ExtKeychain::derive_key_id(1, 1, 0, 0, 0);
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// let blind = blind_sum.secret_key(&keychain.secp())?;
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let blind = keychain.derive_key(0, &key_id, switch).unwrap();
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rx_cx = Context::new(&keychain.secp(), blind, &parent, false, false);
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let (pub_excess, pub_nonce) = rx_cx.get_public_keys(&keychain.secp());
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rx_cx.add_output(&key_id, &None, 0);
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pub_nonce_sum = PublicKey::from_combination(
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keychain.secp(),
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vec![
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&s_cx.get_public_keys(keychain.secp()).1,
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&rx_cx.get_public_keys(keychain.secp()).1,
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],
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)
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.unwrap();
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pub_key_sum = PublicKey::from_combination(
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keychain.secp(),
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vec![
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&s_cx.get_public_keys(keychain.secp()).0,
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&rx_cx.get_public_keys(keychain.secp()).0,
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],
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)
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.unwrap();
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let msg = kernel_sig_msg();
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let sig_part = aggsig::calculate_partial_sig(
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&keychain.secp(),
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&rx_cx.sec_key,
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&rx_cx.sec_nonce,
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&pub_nonce_sum,
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Some(&pub_key_sum),
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&msg,
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)
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.unwrap();
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(pub_excess, pub_nonce, sig_part)
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};
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// check the sender can verify the partial signature
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// received in the response back from the receiver
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{
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let keychain = sender_keychain.clone();
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let msg = kernel_sig_msg();
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let sig_verifies = aggsig::verify_partial_sig(
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&keychain.secp(),
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&rx_sig_part,
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&pub_nonce_sum,
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&receiver_pub_excess,
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Some(&pub_key_sum),
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&msg,
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);
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assert!(!sig_verifies.is_err());
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}
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// now sender signs with their key
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let sender_sig_part = {
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let keychain = sender_keychain.clone();
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let msg = kernel_sig_msg();
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let sig_part = aggsig::calculate_partial_sig(
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&keychain.secp(),
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&s_cx.sec_key,
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&s_cx.sec_nonce,
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&pub_nonce_sum,
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Some(&pub_key_sum),
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&msg,
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)
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.unwrap();
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sig_part
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};
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// check the receiver can verify the partial signature
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// received by the sender
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{
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let keychain = receiver_keychain.clone();
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let msg = kernel_sig_msg();
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let sig_verifies = aggsig::verify_partial_sig(
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&keychain.secp(),
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&sender_sig_part,
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&pub_nonce_sum,
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&sender_pub_excess,
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Some(&pub_key_sum),
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&msg,
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);
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assert!(!sig_verifies.is_err());
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}
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// Receiver now builds final signature from sender and receiver parts
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let (final_sig, final_pubkey) = {
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let keychain = receiver_keychain.clone();
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let msg = kernel_sig_msg();
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let our_sig_part = aggsig::calculate_partial_sig(
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&keychain.secp(),
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&rx_cx.sec_key,
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&rx_cx.sec_nonce,
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&pub_nonce_sum,
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Some(&pub_key_sum),
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&msg,
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)
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.unwrap();
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// Receiver now generates final signature from the two parts
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let final_sig = aggsig::add_signatures(
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&keychain.secp(),
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vec![&sender_sig_part, &our_sig_part],
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&pub_nonce_sum,
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)
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.unwrap();
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// Receiver calculates the final public key (to verify sig later)
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let final_pubkey = PublicKey::from_combination(
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keychain.secp(),
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vec![
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&s_cx.get_public_keys(keychain.secp()).0,
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&rx_cx.get_public_keys(keychain.secp()).0,
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],
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)
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.unwrap();
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(final_sig, final_pubkey)
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};
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// Receiver checks the final signature verifies
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{
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let keychain = receiver_keychain.clone();
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let msg = kernel_sig_msg();
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// Receiver check the final signature verifies
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let sig_verifies = aggsig::verify_completed_sig(
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&keychain.secp(),
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&final_sig,
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&final_pubkey,
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Some(&final_pubkey),
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&msg,
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);
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assert!(!sig_verifies.is_err());
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}
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// Check we can verify the sig using the kernel excess
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{
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let keychain = ExtKeychain::from_random_seed(true).unwrap();
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let msg = kernel_sig_msg();
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let sig_verifies =
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aggsig::verify_single_from_commit(&keychain.secp(), &final_sig, &msg, &kernel_excess);
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assert!(!sig_verifies.is_err());
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}
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}
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#[test]
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fn aggsig_sender_receiver_interaction_offset() {
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let parent = ExtKeychainPath::new(1, 1, 0, 0, 0).to_identifier();
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let switch = SwitchCommitmentType::Regular;
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let sender_keychain = ExtKeychain::from_random_seed(true).unwrap();
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let receiver_keychain = ExtKeychain::from_random_seed(true).unwrap();
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// This is the kernel offset that we use to split the key
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// Summing these at the block level prevents the
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// kernels from being used to reconstruct (or identify) individual transactions
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let kernel_offset = SecretKey::new(&sender_keychain.secp(), &mut thread_rng());
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// Calculate the kernel excess here for convenience.
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// Normally this would happen during transaction building.
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let kernel_excess = {
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let id1 = ExtKeychain::derive_key_id(1, 1, 0, 0, 0);
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let skey1 = sender_keychain.derive_key(0, &id1, switch).unwrap();
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let skey2 = receiver_keychain.derive_key(0, &id1, switch).unwrap();
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let keychain = ExtKeychain::from_random_seed(true).unwrap();
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let blinding_factor = keychain
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.blind_sum(
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&BlindSum::new()
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.sub_blinding_factor(BlindingFactor::from_secret_key(skey1))
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.add_blinding_factor(BlindingFactor::from_secret_key(skey2))
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// subtract the kernel offset here like as would when
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// verifying a kernel signature
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.sub_blinding_factor(BlindingFactor::from_secret_key(kernel_offset.clone())),
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)
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.unwrap();
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keychain
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.secp()
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.commit(0, blinding_factor.secret_key(&keychain.secp()).unwrap())
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.unwrap()
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};
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let s_cx;
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let mut rx_cx;
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// sender starts the tx interaction
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let (sender_pub_excess, _sender_pub_nonce) = {
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let keychain = sender_keychain.clone();
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let id1 = ExtKeychain::derive_key_id(1, 1, 0, 0, 0);
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let skey = keychain.derive_key(0, &id1, switch).unwrap();
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// dealing with an input here so we need to negate the blinding_factor
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// rather than use it as is
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let blinding_factor = keychain
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.blind_sum(
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&BlindSum::new()
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.sub_blinding_factor(BlindingFactor::from_secret_key(skey))
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// subtract the kernel offset to create an aggsig context
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// with our "split" key
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.sub_blinding_factor(BlindingFactor::from_secret_key(kernel_offset)),
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)
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.unwrap();
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let blind = blinding_factor.secret_key(&keychain.secp()).unwrap();
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s_cx = Context::new(&keychain.secp(), blind, &parent, false, false);
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s_cx.get_public_keys(&keychain.secp())
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};
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// receiver receives partial tx
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let pub_nonce_sum;
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let pub_key_sum;
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let (receiver_pub_excess, _receiver_pub_nonce, sig_part) = {
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let keychain = receiver_keychain.clone();
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let key_id = ExtKeychain::derive_key_id(1, 1, 0, 0, 0);
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let blind = keychain.derive_key(0, &key_id, switch).unwrap();
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rx_cx = Context::new(&keychain.secp(), blind, &parent, false, false);
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let (pub_excess, pub_nonce) = rx_cx.get_public_keys(&keychain.secp());
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rx_cx.add_output(&key_id, &None, 0);
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pub_nonce_sum = PublicKey::from_combination(
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keychain.secp(),
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vec![
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&s_cx.get_public_keys(keychain.secp()).1,
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&rx_cx.get_public_keys(keychain.secp()).1,
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],
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)
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.unwrap();
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pub_key_sum = PublicKey::from_combination(
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keychain.secp(),
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vec![
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&s_cx.get_public_keys(keychain.secp()).0,
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&rx_cx.get_public_keys(keychain.secp()).0,
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],
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)
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.unwrap();
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let msg = kernel_sig_msg();
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let sig_part = aggsig::calculate_partial_sig(
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&keychain.secp(),
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&rx_cx.sec_key,
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&rx_cx.sec_nonce,
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&pub_nonce_sum,
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Some(&pub_key_sum),
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&msg,
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)
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.unwrap();
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(pub_excess, pub_nonce, sig_part)
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};
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// check the sender can verify the partial signature
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// received in the response back from the receiver
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{
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let keychain = sender_keychain.clone();
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let msg = kernel_sig_msg();
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let sig_verifies = aggsig::verify_partial_sig(
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&keychain.secp(),
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&sig_part,
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&pub_nonce_sum,
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&receiver_pub_excess,
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Some(&pub_key_sum),
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&msg,
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);
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assert!(!sig_verifies.is_err());
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}
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// now sender signs with their key
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let sender_sig_part = {
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let keychain = sender_keychain.clone();
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let msg = kernel_sig_msg();
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let sig_part = aggsig::calculate_partial_sig(
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&keychain.secp(),
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&s_cx.sec_key,
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&s_cx.sec_nonce,
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&pub_nonce_sum,
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Some(&pub_key_sum),
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&msg,
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)
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.unwrap();
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sig_part
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};
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// check the receiver can verify the partial signature
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// received by the sender
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{
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let keychain = receiver_keychain.clone();
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let msg = kernel_sig_msg();
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let sig_verifies = aggsig::verify_partial_sig(
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&keychain.secp(),
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&sender_sig_part,
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&pub_nonce_sum,
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&sender_pub_excess,
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Some(&pub_key_sum),
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&msg,
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);
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assert!(!sig_verifies.is_err());
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}
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// Receiver now builds final signature from sender and receiver parts
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let (final_sig, final_pubkey) = {
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let keychain = receiver_keychain.clone();
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let msg = kernel_sig_msg();
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let our_sig_part = aggsig::calculate_partial_sig(
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&keychain.secp(),
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&rx_cx.sec_key,
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&rx_cx.sec_nonce,
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&pub_nonce_sum,
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Some(&pub_key_sum),
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&msg,
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)
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.unwrap();
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// Receiver now generates final signature from the two parts
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let final_sig = aggsig::add_signatures(
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&keychain.secp(),
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vec![&sender_sig_part, &our_sig_part],
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&pub_nonce_sum,
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)
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.unwrap();
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// Receiver calculates the final public key (to verify sig later)
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let final_pubkey = PublicKey::from_combination(
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keychain.secp(),
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vec![
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&s_cx.get_public_keys(keychain.secp()).0,
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&rx_cx.get_public_keys(keychain.secp()).0,
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],
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)
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.unwrap();
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(final_sig, final_pubkey)
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};
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// Receiver checks the final signature verifies
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{
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let keychain = receiver_keychain.clone();
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let msg = kernel_sig_msg();
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// Receiver check the final signature verifies
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let sig_verifies = aggsig::verify_completed_sig(
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&keychain.secp(),
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&final_sig,
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&final_pubkey,
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Some(&final_pubkey),
|
|
&msg,
|
|
);
|
|
assert!(!sig_verifies.is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check we can verify the sig using the kernel excess
|
|
{
|
|
let keychain = ExtKeychain::from_random_seed(true).unwrap();
|
|
let msg = kernel_sig_msg();
|
|
let sig_verifies =
|
|
aggsig::verify_single_from_commit(&keychain.secp(), &final_sig, &msg, &kernel_excess);
|
|
|
|
assert!(!sig_verifies.is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn test_rewind_range_proof() {
|
|
let keychain = ExtKeychain::from_random_seed(true).unwrap();
|
|
let builder = proof::ProofBuilder::new(&keychain);
|
|
let key_id = ExtKeychain::derive_key_id(1, 1, 0, 0, 0);
|
|
let key_id2 = ExtKeychain::derive_key_id(1, 2, 0, 0, 0);
|
|
let switch = SwitchCommitmentType::Regular;
|
|
let commit = keychain.commit(5, &key_id, switch).unwrap();
|
|
let extra_data = [99u8; 64];
|
|
|
|
let proof = proof::create(
|
|
&keychain,
|
|
&builder,
|
|
5,
|
|
&key_id,
|
|
switch,
|
|
commit,
|
|
Some(extra_data.to_vec().clone()),
|
|
)
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
let proof_info = proof::rewind(
|
|
keychain.secp(),
|
|
&builder,
|
|
commit,
|
|
Some(extra_data.to_vec().clone()),
|
|
proof,
|
|
)
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
assert!(proof_info.is_some());
|
|
let (r_amount, r_key_id, r_switch) = proof_info.unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(r_amount, 5);
|
|
assert_eq!(r_key_id, key_id);
|
|
assert_eq!(r_switch, switch);
|
|
|
|
// cannot rewind with a different commit
|
|
let commit2 = keychain.commit(5, &key_id2, switch).unwrap();
|
|
let proof_info = proof::rewind(
|
|
keychain.secp(),
|
|
&builder,
|
|
commit2,
|
|
Some(extra_data.to_vec().clone()),
|
|
proof,
|
|
)
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
assert!(proof_info.is_none());
|
|
|
|
// cannot rewind with a commitment to a different value
|
|
let commit3 = keychain.commit(4, &key_id, switch).unwrap();
|
|
let proof_info = proof::rewind(
|
|
keychain.secp(),
|
|
&builder,
|
|
commit3,
|
|
Some(extra_data.to_vec().clone()),
|
|
proof,
|
|
)
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
assert!(proof_info.is_none());
|
|
|
|
// cannot rewind with wrong extra committed data
|
|
let wrong_extra_data = [98u8; 64];
|
|
let proof_info = proof::rewind(
|
|
keychain.secp(),
|
|
&builder,
|
|
commit,
|
|
Some(wrong_extra_data.to_vec().clone()),
|
|
proof,
|
|
)
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
assert!(proof_info.is_none());
|
|
}
|